Discussion Point 2: Chapter Six: How to Avoid Commoditization
Key passages: “A company that finds itself in the
more-than-good-enough circumstance simply can’t win: Either disruption will steal
its markets, or commoditization will steal its profits.” (Page 152) and “The
bedrock principle bears repeating: The companies that are positioned at a spot
in a value chain where performance is not yet good enough will capture the
profit. That is the circumstance where differentiated products, scale-based
cost advantages, and high entry barriers can be created.” (Page158)
Key Take-away: Firms ought to use the law of conservation of
attractive profits to identify high profitability areas.
The two sentences in this key
passage are very rich in insights, as they really tell us where to dig to strike
gold. In this chapter, Christensen sets
up his argument using two extremes on the spectrum of product/service
fulfillment of the customers need to help us understand the benefits of one,
and the problems with the other.
The
More-Than-Good-Enough Circumstance
To delve deeper into this idea, it
is useful to refer to Richard D’Aveni’s work on hyper-competition. He echoes Christensen’s assessment when he
writes: “Thus, the process of competition forces firms to offer a line of high-quality,
low-priced goods that eventually make high quality and lower prices a necessity
for survival.”4 This concept relates to what Christensen calls
commoditization, and clearly supports the idea of dwindling profitability. Furthermore, as described in the first
discussion point, mature industries are susceptible to creative destruction,
which addresses the threat of disruption.
So if well-served markets are problematic, Christensen offers an
alternative, which can help both new ventures and established firms to improve
their odds of growth and profitability. He
makes a very well supported point that the best avenue for growth and
profitability is to deliver quality where quality has been lacking up to this
point. This is consistent with D’Aveni’s
price-quality competition escalation ladder, which culminates with a “need to
move to a new arena of competition.”5 This ladder of escalation when
competition is based on cost-quality advantages is similar to the process of
commoditization and de-commoditization Christensen describes on pages 151 to
154.
The
Not-Yet-Good-Enough Circumstance
As firms uncover “not-yet-good
enough” products of processes, Christensen explains that they can pursue a
differentiation strategy, leverage scale-based cost advantages, and establish
high barriers to entry. He is a little
short on details here, so let us turn to D’Aveni’s work and develop these ideas
further. These three ideas actually parallel his research, as they correspond
to the three arenas of competition he identified in addition to
cost-quality. What Christensen calls
“differentiated products,” D’Aveni defines as “timing and know-how.” D’Aveni does a really good job showing how
the first mover has the choice between using a “leapfrog strategy” (successive
investments in innovation) or moving downstream into higher value-added
products. Sony is a good example of former: “Early on, it built tape recorders
and used the know-how and resources from that project to fuel it production of
transistor radios. It brought out a
pocket-sized transistor radio… Then Sony built on that success with the
development of the Trinitron television in the late 1960s… Sony used and
extended its skills in miniaturization and audio technology to develop this
next innovation.”6 Christensen uses the computer industry in the
1990s to illustrate how money can flow when following the latter strategy. Next, when addressing cost advantages,
D’Aveni looks at competitors with “deep-pockets,” where resource escalation is
one of the strategic options for the incumbent.
Finally, we get to barriers of entry.
Some strategies that D’Aveni gives to building barriers are customer
familiarity, customer loyalty to a local brand, government barriers to foreign
entry, control over domestic distribution systems, local customs, unique factor
advantages (lower cost of labor or capital), and dominance of domestic market
share.7 In every case
however, D’Aveni, also gives possible course of action for new entrants to address
and overcome these tactics.
Law of
Conservation of Attractive Profits
Ultimately, Christensen wraps this
chapter in the book by giving us law of conservation of attractive
profits. This law, inspired from famous
laws of physics, states that: “When the modularity and commoditization cause
attractive profits to disappear at one stage in the value chain, the opportunity
to earn attractive profits with proprietary products will emerge at an adjacent
stage.”8 This can actually be seen as good news, since this
opportunity is equally available to both the incumbent and the new entrant.
Notes
4. R. D’Aveni, Hyper-Competitive Rivalries, The Free Press, New York, 1995, p.29
5. R. D’Aveni, Hyper-Competitive Rivalries, The Free Press, New York, 1995, p.36
6. R. D’Aveni, Hyper-Competitive Rivalries, The Free Press, New York, 1995, p.71
7. R. D’Aveni, Hyper-Competitive Rivalries, The Free Press, New York, 1995, p.99-100
8. C. Christensen, The Innovator’s Solution, Harvard Business Review Press, Boston, 2003, p. 168
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